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Abstract
In this paper, we present a formal model of virtual organisations that incorporates the concept of conﬂicts
of interest. The model, which follows an incremental development approach using Event-B, focuses on
goals and organisations at the abstract level and introduces resources at the concrete level. The model
is motivated by the type of virtual organisations used in the domain of scientiﬁc experiments. Individual
organisations, at the abstract level, are allowed to pursue conﬂicting goals within a virtual organisation.
However, at the concrete level, these conﬂicts are isolated by applying a separation of resources mechanism.
This ensures that no resource is allocated to any two conﬂicting goals.
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1 Introduction
Virtual Organisations (VOs) provide an abstraction to represent inter-organisational
collaborations, a topic of fresh interest given the current exploitation of Internet
technology to create virtual enterprises [9], or the sharing of resources across dif-
ferent organisations as envisaged by Grid computing [11]. A VO can be seen as
a temporary or permanent coalition of geographically dispersed organisations that
pool resources in order to achieve common goals.
In order to support rapid formation of VOs, it is necessary that the potential
partners are ready and prepared to participate in such collaboration. This readiness
includes common interoperable infrastructure, common operating rules, and com-
mon representation of capabilities, among others. The concept of Virtual Breeding
Environment (VBE) has emerged as the necessary context for the creation of VOs
[8]. A VBE can be deﬁned as an association of organisations adhering to a base
long term cooperation agreement and adoption of common operating principles and
infrastructure with the main objective of participating in potential VOs.
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In this paper, we have adopted the view that potential partners in a VO are se-
lected from a VBE. We are interested in goal-oriented VOs, so organisations willing
to participate in a VO will join the VBE, advertising the goals they can achieve and
their resources. We are assuming that this step has been performed previously and
concentrate on the management of VOs.
VO architects should be able to evaluate at design time the likely consequence
of the decisions that they make regarding VO architecture and policies. This paper
contributes to this end by providing a method to analyse conﬂicts of interest in
VOs. In our model, a VO could include conﬂicting goals. Organisations are allowed
to work on conﬂicting goals as long as they do not allocate the same resource to
two conﬂicting goals.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we discuss the problem
of conﬂict of interest in VOs, and in particular within the domain of scientiﬁc
experiments. In Section 3, we review the Event-B reﬁnement methodology and give
a quick guide on the language. In Section 4, we present a model of VOs based on
goals and organisations such that it registers the requirement that conﬂicting goals
within an organisation must be isolated. In Section 5, we present the concrete model,
which contains also resources and ensures that the requirement in the abstract
model is realised through the mechanism of the separation of resources. In Section
6, we discuss related work and ﬁnally, in Section 7, we conclude the paper and give
directions for future work.
2 Conﬂicts of Interest in Virtual Organisations
A VO is created when an organisation wants to achieve a set of goals but it does
not possess all the resources/capabilities needed to do so. The VO management
infrastructure would look for potential partners capable of achieving the VO goals.
In our model, a VO could include conﬂicting goals; furthermore, an organisation
can participate in conﬂicting goals. However, the VO management infrastructure
restricts such organisations by imposing the policy that an organisation cannot
allocate the same resource to two conﬂicting goals. We can see this policy as a
more general version of Brewer and Nash’s Chinese Wall policy [5], imposed on the
resources used in a VO.
For VO management, we abstract from the traditional secure VO lifecycle [3] by
modelling three main phases:
• Selection: for each VO goal, this phase selects from the VBE the set of organ-
isations that can achieve that goal; each organisation allocates the resources it
needs to achieve the goal. For the purpose of this paper, this is the main phase
of interest, where our Chinese Wall policy is enforced.
• Operation: for each VO goal, this phase represents the interaction (collaboration)
among participant organisations in order to achieve that goal.
• Dissolution: when all goals in the VO have been achieved, the VO ﬁnalises its
execution and dissolves.
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The model of VOs we present here is motivated by several examples. Among
these is the management information concerning scientiﬁc experiments undertaken
using large facilities. In this environment, a scientist from one organisation may
be working in collaboration with other organisations on one experiment, whilst his
colleagues from the same organisation may be working on another experiment in
a diﬀerent collaboration on the same facility. The facility providers themselves, in
particular, are often collaborators in many of the experiments.
In many cases, there is a need to ensure the results of one experiment are kept
conﬁdential from another over some period of time in order to ensure the correct
attribution of credit in the publication of the results. In a few cases, even the ”meta
information”, that a particular scientist is working on a particular experiment may
be considered conﬁdential as it may disclose that a particular direction is being
pursued in the research.
Here, experiments are seen as goals, the information as a resource, and the
collaborators as the organisations in a VO. Similar issues arise in modelling collab-
orations using other scientiﬁc resources such as the computing resources provided
by the UK National Grid Service (http://www.grid-support.ac.uk/).
3 Background on Event-B
Event-B [2] is a reﬁnement methodology that is an extension of the B language [1].
The reﬁnement methodology can be used by software architects to incrementally
develop a model of a system starting from the initial, most abstract, model some-
times called the speciﬁcation and following gradually onto further layers of detail
until a model with satisfactory detail is reached. If successful, the most detailed
model will be the implementation itself.
Each layer has preconditions and postconditions associated with it in the style
of Hoare logic [12] and reﬁnement ensures the consistency of the development pro-
cess by strengthening the postconditions and/or the preconditions associated to
each layer thus removing nondeterminism until a deterministic implementation is
reached. In fact, invariants denoting desirable behaviour can be speciﬁed at the
level of each layer as well as across diﬀerent layers, known as gluing invariants.
Reﬁnement then allows us to verify that these invariants are true.
In Event-B, a system is modeled as a machine which is composed of a local state
in the form of variables and any number of events. Events consist of the following
elements: a name, Event, any number of guards, P , and any number of generalised
substitutions, T , as follows:
Event def= WHEN P THEN T END
The syntax of generalised substitutions is deﬁned in Figure 1.
The skip is a do-nothing substitution, which does not aﬀect the machine’s state.
The deterministic substitution, x := E, assigns to a variable, x, the value of an
expression, E. Finally, in a non-deterministic substitution, it is possible to choose
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skip Do nothing
x := E Deterministic substitution
ANY x WHERE P THEN T END Non-deterministic substitution
Fig. 1. The syntax of generalised substitutions.
non-deterministically local variables, x, that will render the guard P true. If this
is the case, then parallel substitutions, T , can be applied. Otherwise, nothing
happens. We sometimes write the syntactic sugar, x :∈ Set as a short form of
ANY z WHERE z ∈ Set THEN x := z END. An event may be ﬁred (i.e. its
substitutions applied) as soon as its conditional guards are satisﬁed. If more than
one event is ready to ﬁre, then one is picked non-deterministically.
Machines have contexts that they can see. A context has the following elements:
a name, a set of carrier sets, a set of constants and a set of axioms. Carrier sets are
essentially user-deﬁned types and constants must have a particular type (primitive
or user-deﬁned). Usually, axioms are used to express such constant types and any
other truths about the context elements.
For a comprehensive description of the Event-B language and its formal meaning,
we refer the reader to more detailed references such as [14].
4 Isolation of Conﬂicting Goals
The ﬁrst Event-B model we present in this paper is an abstract model of VOs
that deﬁnes a VO as a set of goals with organisations collaborating to achieve those
goals. The model highlights potential conﬂict-of-interest situations where a member
organisation may pursue two or more conﬂicting goals during its VO history. The
main components of the model are a context called VBE as shown in Figure 2,
which represents a VBE, and a machine called VO illustrated in Figure 3, which
represents the VO lifecycle.
CONTEXT VBE
SETS
Goals, Status, Organisations
CONSTANTS
Sl, Op, Stop, CoI
AXIOMS
Status = {Sl, Op, Stop}, Sl = Op, Sl = Stop, Op = Stop,
Goals = ∅, Organisations = ∅,
CoI ⊆ P(Goals), ∀e.e∈CoI ⇒ card(e)=2, ∀g.g∈Goals ⇒ {g,g}/∈CoI
END
Fig. 2. The abstract context VBE.
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The VBE context deﬁnes three types: The non-empty type Goals, which rep-
resents the set of possible goals in some VBE; the non-empty type Organisations,
which represents the set of VBE organisations willing to participate in potential
VOs; and ﬁnally the type Status, which contains the ﬂags Sl for the Selection
phase, Op for the Operation and Dissolution phases and Stop, which marks the end
of the VO lifecycle (when no further events are possible). The context also deﬁnes
the set, CoI, which denotes the global conﬂict of interest among goals in the VBE.
The deﬁnition of CoI states that it is a powerset of all two-element sets representing
any two goals that are in conﬂict with each other. It also states that a goal cannot
be in conﬂict with itself.
The VO machine captures essentially three phases of the VO lifecycle: Selec-
tion, Operation and Dissolution. The machine deﬁnes a number of local variables
including the set of goals it is pursuing, a subset of those goals that the VO has
completed and the current goal it is working on. The machine also deﬁnes a col-
laboration model variable, collM, which is a relation from one of its uncompleted
goals (the current goal) to a set of organisations that will collaborate to achieve that
goal. In addition to the current collaboration model, there is also the collaboration
history, collH, which is a relation from any completed goal to the organisations that
have collaborated in the past to achieve that goal. The machine also deﬁnes a status
ﬂag, which indicates the next event to be ﬁred.
An interesting variable in the machine is the conﬂict of interest relation, coi,
which is a relation from any organisation to a pair of goals denoting the fact that
the two goals are conﬂicting and that they must be maintained isolated internally
within the organisation throughout its history of collaborations in the VO. For
example, if an organisation, org, collaborates on a goal, g1, and then later collabo-
rates on another goal, g2, such that {g1,g2}∈CoI, then coi will record the element
(org→(g1→g2)) as one of its memebers.
The creation of the VO is modeled through a non-deterministic initialisation
event in which the set of VO goals is chosen from the overall set of VBE goals. We
next describe the rest of the events in the machine as follows:
• The Selection event: This is the ﬁrst event that is executed after the initialisation
event and in it, an uncompleted goal, aGoal, is chosen and nominated as the
current goal on which the VO is working along with a suitably typed collaboration
model, aCollM, which must contain at least one organisation that will work on
aGoal. The event also selects a suitably typed coi relation, called acoi, which
maps every organisation in the range of aCollM to a pair whose ﬁrst element
is aGoal and the second element is a conﬂicting goal on which the organisation
worked on in the past (in collH). Once these conditions are satisﬁed, Selection
performs a number of substitutions to update the currentGoal, collM, coi and
status variables. The status variable is set to Op to indicate that the machine is
ready to enter the Operation event.
It is interesting to note here that the coi relation is not intended to be a
condition for selecting collaborations but rather an indication to the requirement
of the isolation of conﬂicting goals within organisations.
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MACHINE VO SEES VBE
VARIABLES
status, goals, completedGoals, currentGoal, collM, collH, coi
INVARIANTS
status ∈ Status ∧ goals ∈ P1(Goals) ∧ completedGoals ⊆ goals ∧ currentGoal ⊆ goals
collM ∈ currentGoal ↔ Organisations ∧ collH ∈ completedGoals ↔ Organisations ∧
coi ∈ Organisations ↔ (goals × goals) ∧
/* The Conﬂict of Interest Invariant */
(∀ org,g. org ∈ ran(collM) ∧ {g}=currentGoal ⇒
(∀g1.g1∈completedGoals ∧ (g1 
→org)∈collH ∧ {g,g1}∈CoI ⇒ (org 
→(g 
→g1))∈coi)) ∧
(∀ g0,g1,org. (g0 
→org) ∈ collH ∧ (g1 
→org) ∈ collH ∧ {g0,g1} ∈ CoI ⇒ (org 
→(g0 
→g1)) ∈ coi)
INITIALISATION
BEGIN
goals :∈ P1(Goals) ‖ completedGoals := ∅ ‖ currentGoal := ∅ ‖
collM := ∅ ‖ collH := ∅ ‖ coi := ∅ ‖ status := Sl
END
EVENT Selection
ANY
aGoal, aCollM, acoi
WHERE
status = Sl ∧ aGoal∈(goals\completedGoals) ∧
aCollM∈{aGoal} ↔ Organisations ∧ ran(aCollM) =∅ ∧
acoi∈ran(aCollM)↔({aGoal}× completedGoals) ∧
/*The Chinese Wall Guard*/
∀org.org∈ran(aCollM) ⇒
(∀g1.g1∈completedGoals∧(g1 
→org)∈collH∧{aGoal,g1}∈CoI ⇒ (org 
→(aGoal 
→g1))∈acoi) ∧
/*The Minimality of acoi Guard*/
∀org.org∈ran(aCollM) ⇒
(∀g1.¬g1∈completedGoals∨¬(g1 
→org)∈collH∨¬{aGoal,g1}∈CoI ⇒ ¬(org 
→(aGoal 
→g1))∈acoi)
THEN
currentGoal := {aGoal} ‖ collM := aCollM ‖ coi := coi ∪ acoi ‖ status := Op
END
EVENT Operation
WHEN
status = Op
THEN
completedGoals := completedGoals ∪ currentGoal ‖ collH := collH ∪ collM ‖ status := Sl
END
EVENT Dissolution
WHEN
status = Sl ∧ completedGoals = goals
THEN
status := Stop
END
END
Fig. 3. The VO abstract machine.
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• The Operation event: In this event, the VO adds to the set of completed goals the
current VO goal and at the same time, updates the collaboration history, collH,
to include the current collaboration model, collM. The status ﬂag is reset to the
Sl value to indicate that the VO is now ready to select a new goal.
• The Dissolution event: Once the set of completed goals has reached the set of
VO goals, the VO will have arrived at the end of its lifetime and it is now ready
to dissolve. This is modeled as setting the status ﬂag to Stop, at which point the
VO cannot select any event.
The machine deﬁnes the following conﬂict of interest invariant.
Invariant 1 (Conﬂict of Interest Invariant)
For any organisation, org, a current goal, g, and past completed goals, g0 and g1,
then the following holds true:
• org ∈ ran(collM) ∧ g ∈ currentGoal⇒ (∀g1.g1∈completedGoals ∧ (g1→org)∈collH
∧ {g,g1}∈CoI ⇒ (org→(g→g1))∈coi), and
• (g0→org) ∈ collH ∧ (g1→org) ∈ collH ∧ {g0,g1} ∈ CoI ⇒ (org→(g0→g1)) ∈ coi
Proof. We give here a proof sketch. To prove the invariant, we must show that the
substitutions in all of the events (Initialisation, Selection, Operation and Dissolu-
tion) respect it. This is easy to show for the cases of Initialisation and Dissolution.
However, for the case of Selection, we have to prove that the acoi local variable
preserves the invariant, since acoi is added to coi. This can be shown using the
Chinese Walls guard and the minimality guard, which are used in selecting the acoi
relation. These guards ensure that acoi contains only the right tuples and nothing
else. For the second part of the invariant, Selection only adds acoi to coi, so the
history recorded in coi is still preserved by coi ∪ acoi. For the case of Operation,
the ﬁrst part of the invariant can be easily proven to hold for the new values of
completedGoals and collH variables. For the case of the second part, we must prove
that the new values of collH (which include the current collM) preserve the second
part of the invariant. This can be done by showing that the domain of collM is a
singleton and that no goal is conﬂicting with itself. 
The ﬁrst implication of the invariant states that if an organisation is collaborating
towards some current goal and has in the past collaborated on some conﬂicting
goal, then the conﬂict of interest relation coi must register this fact. On the other
hand, the second implication states that if an organisation has collaborated in the
past on two conﬂicting goals, then that fact will have been captured by the coi
relation. This invariant is essentially maintaining information relating to the need
for a Chinese Wall separation between conﬂicting goals that an organisation is (has
been) working on.
5 Separation of Resources
To enforce the isolation of conﬂicting goals captured in the abstract model of the
previous section, we introduce more detail into the model. This detail is represented
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by the concept of resources committed by organisations owning them to the cause of
achieving the goals of a VO. The main idea driving the concrete model presented in
this section is to enforce a separation, within each organisation, among the resources
allocated to conﬂicting goals. Hence an organisation wishing to work on conﬂicting
goals must not use the same resource for both goals.
The concrete model is composed from a reﬁned context, called VBEResources, as
shown in Figure 4, and a reﬁned machine, called VOResources, as shown in Figure
5, where, for the sake of conciseness, we have only included the extra detail. The
VBEResources context introduces a new non-empty type, Resources, to represent
all the resources advertised by organisations in the VBE, and a function, ownedBy,
which denotes the ownership of resources by organisations. The fact that ownedBy
is a function and not a relation implies that every resource is owned by a single
organisation.
CONTEXT VBEResources REFINES VBE
SETS
Resources
CONSTANTS
ownedBy
AXIOMS
Resources = ∅, ownedBy ∈ Resources → Organisations
END
Fig. 4. The reﬁned context VBEResources.
On the other hand, the reﬁned machine introduces two new variables: the allo-
cation model, allocM, and the allocation history, allocH. The former is a relation
from the current goal to resources allocated to it and the latter is a relation from
completed goals to resources allocated to them in the past. The machine is still
composed from the same events representing the VO lifecycle, namely, Selection,
Operation and Dissolution.
In the Selection event, a local variable, anAllocM, represnting an allocation
model, is chosen that will achieve the current working goal, aGoal, using a non-
empty set of resources. This variable is then assigned to allocM. The allocation
model variable must sound and complete with respect to the collaboration model
variable introduced in the abstract machine. This is ensured by the following two
conditions, respectively:
∀r.(aGoal → r) ∈ anAllocM ⇒ (aGoal → ownedBy(r)) ∈ aCollM
∀o.(aGoal → o) ∈ aCollM ⇒ (∃r.ownedBy(r) = o ∧ (aGoal → r) ∈ anAllocM)
The soundness condition ensures that allocated resources belong to VO members
collaborating on the current goal and therefore there are no foreign resources. The
completeness condition, on the other hand, ensures that every collaborating organ-
isation commits at least one resource to the achievement of the goal it is pursuing,
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MACHINE VOResources REFINES VO SEES VBEResources
VARIABLES
. . . allocM, allocH . . .
INVARIANTS
allocM ∈ currentGoal ↔ Resources ∧
allocH ∈ completedGoals ↔ Resources ∧
/*The Chinese Wall Invariant*/
(∀r,g0,g1.g0∈currentGoal ∧ (g1 
→r) ∈ allocH ∧ ¬(g1 
→r)∈allocM ∧ (ownedBy(r) 
→(g0 
→g1))∈coi ⇒
¬(g0 
→r)∈allocM) ∧
(∀r,g0,g1.(g0 
→r) ∈ allocH ∧ (g1 
→r) ∈ allocH ⇒ ¬(ownedBy(r) 
→(g0 
→g1))∈coi) ∧
. . .
INITIALISATION
BEGIN
. . . allocM := ∅ ‖ allocH := ∅ . . .
END
EVENT Selection
ANY
. . . anAllocM . . .
WHERE
anAllocM∈{aGoal}↔Resources ∧ ran(anAllocM)/∈∅ ∧
/*Soundness of anAllocM*/
∀r.(aGoal 
→r)∈anAllocM ⇒ (aGoal 
→ownedBy(r))∈aCollM ∧
/*Completeness of anAllocM*/
∀o.(aGoal 
→o)∈aCollM ⇒ (∃r.ownedBy(r)=o ∧ (aGoal 
→r)∈anAllocM) ∧
/*Chinese Wall Guard*/
∀r,g.(g 
→r)∈allocH ∧ ¬(g
→r)∈anAllocM ∧ (ownedBy(r) 
→(aGoal 
→g))∈ coi ∪ acoi ⇒
¬(aGoal 
→r)∈anAllocM
. . .
THEN
. . . allocM := anAllocM . . .
END
EVENT Operation
WHEN
. . .
THEN
. . . allocH := allocH ∪ allocM . . .
END
EVENT Dissolution
. . .
END
END
Fig. 5. The VOResources concrete machine.
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i.e. there are no idle organisations.
The Chinese Wall guard ensures that the allocation model variable is chosen
such that no resource is allocated to the current working goal that was allocated,
in the past, to a conﬂicting goal:
∀r, g.(g → r) ∈ allocH ∧ ¬(g → r) ∈ anAllocM ∧ (ownedBy(r) → (aGoal → g)) ∈
coi ∪ acoi ⇒ ¬(aGoal → r) ∈ anAllocM
The next event, Operation, among other actions updates the allocation history,
allocH, by adding to it the current value of the allocation model, allocM.
The following gluing invariant provides a link between coi and the resource
allocation model and history relations.
Invariant 2 (The Chinese Walls Invariant)
For any resource, r, and two goals, g0 and g1, then the following holds true for all
the reﬁned events:
• ∀r,g0,g1.g0∈currentGoal ∧ (g1→r) ∈ allocH ∧ ¬(g1→r)∈allocM ∧
(ownedBy(r)→(g0→g1))∈coi ⇒ ¬(g0→r)∈allocM
• ∀r,g0,g1.(g0→r) ∈ allocH ∧ (g1→r) ∈ allocH ⇒ ¬(ownedBy(r)→(g0→g1))∈coi
Proof. The proof of the invariant relies on showing that substitutions in every
event in the concrete machine preserve the invariant. This can be shown using the
Chinese Wall guard for the Selection event. In the Operation event, the proof is
based on showing that the domain of allocM will always be a singleton goal and
that no goal is conﬂicting with itself. 
This invariant states that the current goal will never share a resource within an
organisation that was allocated in the past to a conﬂicting goal within the same
organisation. This isolation of resources will be based on information recorded
by the coi relation in the abstract machine. The invariant demonstrates how the
Chinese Wall policy is reﬁned from the abstract level to the concrete level.
6 Related Work
Conﬂicts of interest have been a topic of interest in information security since the
early days when Brewer and Nash proposed the Chinese Wall security policy [5]. We
have presented here a more general policy for managing conﬂicts of interest, which
indeed it has been inspired by broad versions on the Chinese Wall policy. In Kelley
Sobel and Alves-Foss’ Chinese Wall model [16], after an individual has accessed
an object, s/he is not permitted to access data from an object that is classiﬁed as
having a conﬂict-of-interest. In our model, after a VO resource is allocated to a
goal, it is not then permitted to allocate such resource to conﬂicting goals.
We have followed the B-method approach to security, in which security proper-
ties are represented in terms of invariants that are preserved by a process of step-wise
reﬁnement [4]. This technique has been successfully applied in modeling security
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properties of network monitors [17] and the Mondex Electronic Purse [7].
Conﬂicts of interest arise naturally in dynamic coalitions such as virtual organ-
isations. To our knowledge, there is not previous work on analysing conﬂicts of
interest in virtual organisations. Recently, Bryans et al [6] have modeled formally
general aspects of dynamic coalitions paying especial attention to information ﬂow.
They use the Vienna Development Method (VDM) [13] to construct a suit of mod-
els representing important aspects of coalitions: membership policies, information
discovery, and information transfer. However, the conﬂict-of-interest dimension is
not included in their analysis. In [18], Zhou and Foley describe a logic-based lan-
guage that provides a foundation for coalition regulation and security policies. They
propose a formal framework for regulating the establishment of dynamic coalitions
in which coalitions are formed with the involvement of founders, constructors and
oversight, and do not rely on the traditional notion of a super-administrator; their
emphasis is on coalition delegation.
7 Conclusion
We have modeled conﬂicts of interest in VOs using the Event-B speciﬁcation lan-
guage [2] supported by the RODIN toolkit (http://rodin.cs.ncl.ac.uk/). The
main elements in our abstract speciﬁcation (Section 4) are goals and organisations;
events model the main phase of a VO lifecycle: goal selection, operation, and dis-
solution. The security property is represented by marking – i.e. adding to the
coi relation — those organisations that participate in conﬂicting goals. The main
elements in the concrete speciﬁcation (Section 5) are goals, organisations and re-
sources. The security property states that an organisation cannot allocate the same
resource to two conﬂicting goals. The nature of the reﬁnement that we veriﬁed is
safety reﬁnement, that is, any behaviour (trace of events) of the concrete model
must be behaviour of the abstract one.
One advantage of using proof support tools like RODIN was that we were able
to evolve the model gradually, e.g. by redeﬁning the diﬀerent elements and relations
of the model till the most suitable ones were reached. This eventually helped clarify
our understanding of the domain of the problem we are dealing with.
This work being part of project GridTrust (http://www.gridtrust.eu), we
aim in the short term to apply the same approach to analyse conﬂicts of interest
in the case of inter-enterprise knowledge management systems, since this is one of
the applications being developed in the GridTrust project. In the medium term,
we plan to use Event-B to model other security properties in VOs, in particular
role-based access control [10] and continuous usage of resources [15]. We also plan
to investigate further layers of detail in the model beyond the resource layer. In
particular, we are interested in adding datasets to the model in which case it will
be possible to express invariants about information ﬂow.
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